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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION: SHOULD DIFFERENCES IN A
STATE’S POLITICAL HISTORY
AND CULTURE MATTER?
William P. Marshall*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,1 the
United States Supreme Court struck down federal limits on independent
corporate campaign expenditures.2 In a deeply divided decision, the Court
ruled that such limitations cut at the heart of political discourse and were
therefore unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.3
One year later, in Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General of Montana,4 the Montana Supreme Court faced a parallel First
Amendment challenge against a state law restricting independent corporate
campaign expenditures.5 Unlike the United States Supreme Court in Citizens United, however, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the independent
corporate expenditure limitation.6 The rationale that the Montana Supreme
Court offered in distinguishing Citizens United can be summarized in three
words: “Montana is different.”7 According to the Montana Supreme Court,
Montana’s history8 and political culture9 were such that the state’s rationale
in restricting corporate expenditure constituted a compelling state interest
even if there was no compelling interest justifying prohibiting independent
corporate campaign expenditures at the federal level.10
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am deeply grateful to Anthony Johnstone for his comments on an earlier draft of this essay and to Andrew Webman for his research assistance.
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id. at 913 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
3. Id. at 913.
4. W. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Atty. Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011), cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition Partn., Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
5. Id. at 18 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–227(1)).
6. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 13.
7. Id. at 6 (“[U]nlike Citizens United, this case concerns Montana law, Montana elections and it
arises from Montana history.”).
8. Id. at 9 (“[In the early 1900s,] naked corporate manipulation of the very government (Governor
and Legislature) of the State ultimately resulted in populist reforms that are still part of Montana law.”).
9. Id. at 11 (“Issues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence upon agriculture and
extractive resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and low campaign costs make
Montana especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to the detriment of democracy
and the republican form of government.”) (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 13.

80

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74

The Montana Court’s decision was short-lived. The case was appealed, and the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed.11 In a
terse 5–4 decision, the Court announced simply, “The question presented in
this case is whether the holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana
state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does.”12
The United States Supreme Court decision, however, did not engage
the Montana Supreme Court’s reasoning, stating only that the state court
“fail[ed] to meaningfully distinguish” Citizens United.13 The Court thus
left unexplained why it was not persuaded by the state court’s rationale that
Montana’s political culture and history justified a different result with respect to the state’s campaign limits than the Court reached in Citizens
United with respect to federal limitations.14
This essay directly responds to the Montana Court’s assertion. Part II
examines and expands upon the Montana Supreme Court’s claim that Montana is different. It suggests that not only was the state court correct in its
assessment of Montana but in fact all states are “different” in the sense that
all states have unique political cultures. Part III reviews the effects of federal statutory and constitutional law in shaping the political cultures of the
states, noting that in some circumstances federal law has dramatically affected the states’ political cultures but that in other areas the states have
been relatively free to develop and sustain their internal political cultures
without federal interference. The section ends by raising the question of
whether campaign finance rules are ones that should generally be federalized or whether they constitute the types of regulations that should be left to
the states. Part IV responds to this question by offering the normative suggestion that, given the differences between the states’ political cultures, it
makes sense that campaign finance rules vary from state to state. Part V
addresses the difficult question of constitutionality: do the differences
among the states, and between the states and the federal government, support different results on the legality of campaign finance restrictions under
the First Amendment? Is it constitutionally permissible that a campaign
finance regulation that is found unconstitutional in one state be somehow
upheld in another? Part VI briefly raises the question of whether recent
11. Am. Tradition Partn. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Even the four Justices dissenting from the Court’s summary reversal did not accept the Montana Court’s reasoning on its own terms. The dissent argued only that the state court’s conclusion that
the state had a compelling state interest in regulating corporate campaign contributions indicated that
Citizens United was wrongly decided and should therefore be revisited. The dissent did not address the
state court’s contention that Montana’s corporate restrictions could be distinguished from the federal
limitations because of the state’s particular political culture and history. Id. at 2491–2492 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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developments in the nationalization of American politics means that preserving the states’ political cultures is no longer a valid concern. Part VII
offers a short conclusion.
II.

ARE THE STATES DIFFERENT?

As noted above, the central assertion of the Montana Supreme Court in
distinguishing Citizens United was that Montana is different. The Montana
Court was right. Montana is different. Part of this, as the state court explained, is based in history.15 The mining industry that dominated Montana’s economy for so many years also produced the so-called Copper
Kings who, in turn, dominated the State’s political system.16
Montana is also “different” because of other factors. Contrast Montana, for example, with the state of California. Montana’s population is
approximately one million people.17 California’s population is thirty-eight
million.18 Think of what this disparity in population means in terms of how
expensive it is to run a statewide campaign. The last (2010) gubernatorial
race in California, for example, cost over $250 million.19 The 2008 election
in Montana, by comparison, cost $2.5 million.20 A statewide candidate in
California, consequently, has to raise and spend more money in order to be
competitive and, unless she is extraordinarily independently wealthy, spend
considerably more time and energy soliciting contributions than her Montana counterpart.
The disparity in population also leads to differences in the type of
campaigning done by the candidates. In California, the race has to center
15. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 11 (“[When the statute in question was enacted,] the State
of Montana and its government were operating under a mere shell of legal authority, and the real social
and political power was wielded by powerful corporate managers to further their own business interests.
The voters had more than enough . . . .”).
16. Id. at 8–9. See also Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United, Caperton,
and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 Mont. L. Rev. 25 (2012).
17. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Montana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/30000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012).
18. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: California, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/06000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012).
19. National Institute on Money in State Politics, California 2010: Governor Candidates, http://
www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=CA&y=2010&f=G (accessed
Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting a figure upwards of $254 million that includes primary and general election
spending by all thirty-six candidates). See also Seema Mehta & Michael J. Mishak, Brown Cruises to
Win, L.A. Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/03/local/la-me-election-20101103 (Nov. 3, 2010)
(reporting that the two main candidates for California Governor alone spent upwards of $175 million).
20. National Institute on Money in State Politics, Montana 2008: Governor Candidates, http://
www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=MT&y=2008&f=G
(accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting a figure of $2.5 million that includes primary and general election
spending by all six candidates for Montana Governor). See also W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at
10 (“[A]ll legislative and statewide candidates for office rais[ed] a total of around $7 million in 2008.”).
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primarily in the airwaves.21 There is no way that a statewide candidate can
reach a significant portion of the electorate by grassroots activities such as
personal appearances, town hall meetings, or door-to-door campaigning. In
Montana, on the other hand, face-to-face grassroots campaigning is not only
possible, it is expected.22
The differences between the two states may have as much or even
greater effect on elections for more local races. The sizes of Montana’s and
California’s statehouses, for example, are roughly equivalent. Montana has
50 state senators and 100 state representatives,23 while California’s numbers are 40 and 80 respectively.24 But consider what the disparity in population between the two states means in its practical effect in a state legislative race. In Montana there is a state senator for every 20,000 persons while
in California there is a state senator for every 1 million persons. A million
dollar state senate campaign in California consequently means that only $1
is spent per citizen. A million dollar state race in Montana means that $50
has been spent for each citizen.
And Montana is not the only state that is different. New Hampshire,
for example, has a population of only 1.3 million,25 but it has 400 members
in its House of Representatives26—or one representative for only 3,250
people. That means statehouse politics in New Hampshire are far more
localized than in a more sparsely populated state like Montana. And it
means a one million dollar house race constitutes an expenditure of $285
per citizen.
Nebraska, meanwhile, has its own unique political landscape, occasioned by the fact that it has a unicameral legislature whose members are
elected on a nonpartisan basis.27 This changes both how campaigns are
waged and how much power a legislator has once elected. In Nebraska, for
example, an individual need not have party backing in order to become
nominated or elected to the statehouse, and an individual legislator has as
21. See Seema Mehta & Maeve Reston, Jerry Brown Nearly Matched Meg Whitman’s Campaign
Spending on TV in Final Weeks of Race, L.A. Times, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/01/local/lame-governor-money-20110201/2 (Feb. 1, 2011) (“Between Sept. 1 and Election Day [Nov. 2], Whitman
spent $40 million buying airtime to Brown’s $29 million.”).
22. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 10–11 (“Montana, with its small population, enjoys political campaigns marked by person-to-person contact and a low cost of advertising compared to other
states. . . . [T]he dynamic of local Montana political office races . . . [has] historically been characterized by the low-dollar, broad-based campaigns run by Montana candidates.”).
23. Lynn Hellebust & Kristen Hellebust, State Legislative Sourcebook 2012: A Resource Guide to
Legislative Information in the Fifty States 301 (Govt. Research Serv. 2012).
24. Id. at 55.
25. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: New Hampshire, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/33000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012).
26. Hellebust & Hellebust, supra n. 23, at 329.
27. Id. at 311.
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much power as any other, regardless of party, to introduce new legislation
for consideration by the legislature as a whole.28
The location of media markets can also have a dramatic effect on elections. New Jersey has a population similar to that of Georgia and Michigan,29 but statewide campaigns in that state are much more expensive30
because candidates in New Jersey have to advertise in the very expensive
media markets of New York City and Philadelphia. Georgia and Michigan,
in contrast, are dominated by only one media market.
Population, the number and kind of legislative districts, and the location of media markets are only some of the variables that affect the nature
and substance of political campaigns. A state’s political traditions and history, as the Montana State Supreme Court realized, can have an enormous
effect on how campaigns are run31 and how campaigns are perceived by the
voters.32 Maine, for example, has a tradition of electing independent candidates that gives those waging a campaign outside of traditional party structures greater chances of winning than in most other states.33 In some states,
28. See generally Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 Neb. L. Rev.
791 (1997) (discussing the advantages of the Nebraska system). For a more skeptical account, see
James R. Rogers, Judicial Review Standards in Unicameral Legislative Systems: A Positive Theoretic
and Historical Analysis, 33 Creighton L. Rev. 65, 86–100 (1999).
29. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: New Jersey, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/34000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting New Jersey’s population to be 8.8 million); U.S.
Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Michigan, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26000.
html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting Michigan’s population to be 9.8 million); U.S. Census Bureau,
State & County Quickfacts: Georgia, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/13000.html (accessed Oct.
13, 2012) (reporting Georgia’s population to be 9.8 million).
30. Compare National Institute on Money in State Politics, New Jersey 2009: Governor Candidates, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.phtml?s=NJ&y=2009&f
=G (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting a figure of $52.5 million that includes primary and general
election spending by all eight candidates) with National Institute on Money in State Politics, Michigan
2010: Governor Candidates, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/state_candidates.
phtml?s=MI&y=2010&f=G (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting a figure of $26.5 million that includes
primary and general election spending by all 15 candidates) and National Institute on Money in State
Politics, Georgia 2010: Governor Candidates, http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/
state_candidates.phtml?s=GA&y=2010&f=G (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting a figure of $33.4 million that includes primary and general election spending by all 21 candidates).
31. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 9–10 (“[E]ven small expenditures of money can impact
Montana elections. . . . [In 2008] the average candidate for the Montana House raised $7,475 and the
average candidate for the Montana Senate raised $13,299.”).
32. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 10 (noting one Montana politician’s observation that
“voters were concerned that they ‘didn’t really count’ in the political process unless they can make a
material financial contribution . . . .”).
33. In the 1994 and 1998 elections, Maine elected independent Angus King governor, and in 1974,
it elected independent James Longley. In the 2010 gubernatorial election, Mainers very nearly elected
independent Eliot Cutler (Cutler garnered 36% of the vote while Republican Paul LePage, the eventual
winner, garnered 38%). Michael Barone & Chuck McCutcheon, The Almanac of American Politics
2012 717 (U. Chicago Press 2011).
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soliciting and raising money from out-of-state contributors can be a political liability,34 but in others it is not as much of a concern.35
Numerous other factors also lead to divergences in political cultures
among the states. Demography is one major reason, as race, religion, and
economic status each have profound effects on voting patterns.36 Political
rules are another. Term limits, for example, force turnover in political offices, arguably creating a culture with less political entrenchment and more
people ready to directly participate in government by running for office.37
A state that elects its judges may view the judiciary more politically than
those states whose judges are appointed.38 Even a state’s geography can
play a significant role in how a state conducts its politics. Montana and
Rhode Island may have roughly equivalent populations,39 but the sheer size
of Montana means that statewide in-person campaigning will be more ardu34. For example, the governor of Wisconsin recently faced sharp criticism and national attention
for the vast sums he received from out-of-state contributors in the state’s gubernatorial recall election in
June 2012. See e.g. Claire O’Connor, Gov. Scott Walker’s Big Money Backers Include 13 Out-Of-State
Billionaires,
Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2012/06/05/gov-scott-walkers-bigmoney-backers-include-13-out-of-state-billionaires/ (June 5, 2012).
35. Out-of-state contributions, for example, are considered relatively routine in California, in part
because of the prominent role the state plays on the national scene. See Evelyn Larrubia, Big Donors
Give Far and Wide, Influence Out-of-State Races and Issues, California Watch, http://californiawatch.
org/dailyreport/big-donors-give-far-and-wide-influence-out-state-races-and-issues-18344
(Oct.
15,
2012).
36. See Malcolm E. Jewell & Sarah M. Morehouse, Political Parties and Elections in American
States 12 (4th ed., CQ Press 2001) (noting that distributions of people of different races, religions, or
socioeconomic status within a particular constituency can have important consequences on local political culture, at least with respect to issues on which those groups are divergent).
37. See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 83, 193 (1997) (cited in
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of
the Political Process 1004 (4th ed., Foundation Press 2012)) (arguing that term limits reduce collective
action problems that face non-incumbents when they run against incumbents and also lower barriers to
entry into professional politics).
38. See The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania, Public Understanding of and Support for the Courts, http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/2007
1017_JudicialSurvey/Judicial_Findings_10-17-2007.pdf (Oct. 17, 2007) (citing statistics showing that
the public favors direct election over gubernatorial appointment (64% to 31%), but that “[l]iving in a
state that holds partisan judicial elections is negatively related to the belief that the courts are interpreting the law and not legislating from the bench”). See also Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Speech: The
Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 973, 995 (2001) (“The public perception is that [elected]
judges are influenced by campaign contributions.”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Foreword, in James Sample,
Adam Skaggs, Jonathan Blitzer & Linda Casey, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000–2009:
Decade of Change, http://brennan.3cdn.net/d091dc911bd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.pdf (Aug. 2010)
(“[T]hree out of every four Americans believe that campaign contributions affect courtroom decisions.”)
(cited in W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 13); see generally Melinda Gann Hall, State Courts:
Politics and the Judicial Process, in Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis 229, 245–
250 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson eds., 9th ed., CQ Press 2008) (describing four judicial selection
systems currently in use and listing which states use which system).
39. See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Montana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/30000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting Montana’s population to be just under one
million); U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts: Rhode Island, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
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ous, expensive, and time consuming than in Rhode Island, where the candidate has far less ground to cover. Campaign strategies therefore are adjusted accordingly.
All states, then, are different; not just Montana.40 That difference,
moreover, is significant even beyond the quantitative factors of population,
demography, size of the legislature, and media costs noted above. Each
state has, what political scientists term, its own “political culture”41 formed
in part by custom and tradition42 as well as by some of the more quantitative measures noted above.43 And as that political science literature further
explains, those differences are deep and have substantial consequences.44
qfd/states/44000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting Rhode Island’s population to be just over one
million).
40. States are not only different from each other; they are also different—in some ways even more
dramatically—than the federal government. To begin with, the population of the United States is 311
million, dwarfing the populations of any single state. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quickfacts:
USA, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012). The costs of maintaining a national campaign are therefore exponentially greater than maintaining any state campaign.
See 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial Activity Summarized: Receipts Nearly Double 2004 Total,
Fed. Election Commn., http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml (June 8, 2009)
(“Financial activity of 2008 presidential candidates and national party convention committees . . . total[ed] more than $1.8 billion.”).
Second, the chief executive officer, the President, is not elected on the basis of the most votes that
he or she receives, as in the states, but rather on the basis of his or her winning a majority of votes in the
Electoral College—a structure that leads to campaign strategies being centered on winning “swing
states” rather than on more general appeals to the nation as a whole. See George Rabinowitz & Stuart
Elaine MacDonald, The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 65, 80
(1986) (demonstrating that voters in certain states are over 20 times more likely to determine the outcome of a presidential election).
Third, one branch of the national legislature, the United States Senate, is not equally proportioned
(unlike any of the states) meaning that federal legislative power is disproportionally concentrated in
representatives from states with smaller populations.
41. See Gabriel A. Almond & G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental
Approach 50 (Little, Brown and Co. 1966) (defining “political culture” as “the pattern of individual
attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system”). See generally
Steven G. Koven & Christopher Mausolff, The Influence of Political Culture on State Budgets: Another
Look at Elazar’s Formulation, 32 Am. Rev. Pub. Admin. 66–70 (2002) (describing the landscape of
scholarship on political cultures).
42. Daniel Elazar’s influential framework placed each of the states into three categories of governmental culture: (1) moralistic culture, where government is a legitimizing instrument for promoting
public welfare—best characterized by the Puritan establishments in New England; (2) individualistic
culture, which is marked by a preference for limited government and religious tolerance—best characterized by the Quaker settlements in the middle states; and (3) traditionalistic culture, where government
was the means of maintaining existing order—best characterized by the governments of the South,
which adopted many of the norms of European landed gentry. Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A
View from the States 86–94 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1966).
43. Political cultures affect political structures by defining the way those structures are evaluated.
In other words, a constituency’s values, as shown through its political culture, determines how that
society structures government to best accommodate those values and also defines the criteria used to
evaluate the effectiveness of those structures. See Koven & Mausolff, supra n. 41, at 67.
44. See Robert S. Erikson, John P. McIver & Gerald C. Wright, Jr., State Political Culture and
Public Opinion, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 797, 808 (1987) (“A state’s partisan or ideological bent seems
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There is finally one further nuance to consider in examining the differences between the states: some of the differences in political culture between the states may express very different views of democratic theory. As
the political scientist Robert Dahl once explained, there is no one theory for
democracy.45 And there is no better evidence of Dahl’s assertion than taking a look at the quilt of the divergent democracies that are the states; indeed, each state appears to express its own theory of democracy.46
Most states, for example, have independent attorneys general,47 expressing a political theory that democracy is best served by diluting executive power and having checks on its exercise from within the executive
branch48—a theory that is different from those of the states (and the federal
government) that allow the governor (or president) to remove an attorney
general at her discretion.49 Other states take this model of the divided executive even further—providing independence to a wide range of executive
officers including secretaries of state, treasurers, and auditors, among other
state officers.50
The divided executive is just one of many examples. The states that
elect judges reflect a different vision of the independence and accountability of the judiciary in a democracy than those whose judges are appointed.51
more a function of its political history and development than of the characteristics of its population.”);
Barbara Norrander & Clyde Wilcox, State Residency, State Laws, and Public Opinion, in Public Opinion in State Politics 38, 49 (Jeffrey E. Cohen ed., Stanford U. Press 2006) (“state residency [is] . . . a
small but important determinant of public opinion on a host of issues, from core attitudes such as
partisanship and ideology, to opinions on” specific issues); see generally Politics in the American
States: A Comparative Analysis, supra n. 38 (describing the different political structures of various
states).
45. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 1 (U. Chi. Press 1956) (“There is no democratic theory—there are only democratic theories.”). See also Paul S. Edwards & Nelson W. Polsby,
Introduction: The Judicial Regulation of Political Processes—In Praise of Multiple Criteria, 9 Yale L.
& Policy Rev. 190, 194 (1991) (indicating that no generally accepted theory of democracy exists).
46. Cf. Elazar, supra n. 42 (noting the states’ differing views on the role of government).
47. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and
Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L.J. 2446, 2448 (2006) (noting that the state attorney
general is an independent officer not removable by the governor in 48 states).
48. Id. at 2467–2468 (describing some of the normative advantages of independent attorneys general).
49. See e.g. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994) (discussing the underlying theory of the so-called unitary executive);
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 23, 31
(1995) (same).
50. See Book of the States vol. 44, 231 (2012 ed., Council of St. Govt. 2012) (listing which executive officers are independently elected in the 50 states as well as in American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). See also Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen,
The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1385, 1399–1400 (2008).
51. See Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for Accountability 3–5 (U. of Texas Press 1980) (“The concept of an elected judiciary emerged during the Jacksonian
era as part of a larger movement aimed at democratizing the political process in America . . . . By the
turn of the century, concern over the adverse effects of partisan politics on the quality and operation of
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States that allow voters to directly enact or approve laws by the initiative
and referendum process signal a far different view of democracy than states
that allow laws to be passed only by representatives.52 The list goes on.
The question is: should these different political cultures and the different
political theories that they may represent lead to a different set of election
rules?
III.

THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL LAW ON THE STATES’
POLITICAL CULTURES

Because each state has its own political culture, it is not surprising that
each state also has its own unique set of laws and constitutional provisions
governing its political processes. In fact, it may very well be that a state’s
rules governing its political processes have as much role in forming a
state’s political culture as the political culture has in forming the state’s
governing rules.53 But whichever is the cart and whichever is the horse,
there is no doubt that governing rules differ considerably from state to state.
This is not to say the states are free to develop their rules and maintain
their political cultures without external constraints.54 Federal structures
also play a significant role. The Constitution, both in its original form55 and
as amended,56 places specific and considerable limitations on how a state
can structure its politics. Congress also has been a force in re-ordering the
states’ internal politics. From the Reapportionment Act of 1842 requiring
that the states use single member districts in electing members to the House
of Representatives,57 through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protecting the
the judiciary led many states to replace partisan elections with systems of nonpartisan nomination and
election.”).
52. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1503, 1526–1530
(1990).
53. For an excellent account of how democratic structures including constitutional provisions affect
political culture, see Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (Oxford U. Press, Inc. 2012).
54. Anthony Johnstone, The Federalist Safeguards of Politics (unpublished ms. Sept. 30, 2012)
(copy on file with Anthony Johnstone) (discussing the effects of the three federal branches on the states’
political cultures).
55. See U.S. Const. arts. I, § 4, cl. 1 (providing that Congress may regulate “Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives”), IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government”).
56. See U.S. Const. amends. XV (establishing that Congress has the power to prohibit state governments from denying a citizen the right to vote on account of “race, color, or previous condition of
servitude”), XVII (establishing direct election of United States Senators by popular vote), XIX (establishing that Congress has the power to prohibit state governments from denying a citizen the right to
vote on account of sex), XXVI (establishing that Congress has the power to prohibit state governments
from denying a citizen, who is eighteen years of age or older, the right to vote on account of age).
57. Reapportionment Act of 1842, Ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. Before the Act’s passage, a number of states
elected Congressional representatives from multimember districts. See Issacharoff et al., supra n. 37, at
1245.
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rights of minority voters and guarding against racial gerrymandering,58 to
the more recently enacted Help America Vote Act reaching into the technicalities of election administration,59 Congress has at times enacted significant and far reaching legislation affecting the states’ internal political climates.
And, of course, United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting
broad constitutional guarantees such as the Equal Protection Clause and
Free Speech Clause have also had profound effects on the states’ political
cultures.60 The political patronage cases virtually rewrote the way that
some states conducted their political business and weakened the roles of
what had been powerful party machines.61 The White Primary Cases62
broke open the political parties’ internal processes of nominating candidates. The decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White63 fundamentally changed the way judicial elections are conducted.64 And Dunn v.
Blumstein65 directly addressed, and dismissed, the right of the state to attempt to insulate its political culture from those who might not be familiar
with it.66 In Blumstein, the state asserted that voter residency requirements
were necessary to assure that newly-arrived voters had experience with a
state’s political culture before exercising the franchise, but the Court found
that rationale insufficient to sustain the regulations.67
The most dramatic example of a Supreme Court decision changing a
state’s political culture is undoubtedly Reynolds v. Sims68 requiring states to
apportion the branches of their legislature according to the principle of one
person, one vote.69 The Reynolds decision fundamentally changed state
government, immediately moving centers of political power from rural ar58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973p (enacted under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 438).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 15401 (enacted under the Help America Vote Act of 2002, § 303, 116 Stat. 1666,
1708–1714).
60. For a general account of the Supreme Court’s rulings on election law, see Richard H. Pildes,
Foreword, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics—The Supreme Court, 2003 Term, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 28 (2004).
61. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
62. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
63. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
64. See e.g. Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes after Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 181, 182 (2004).
65. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
66. Id. at 331–333 (striking down durational residency requirements for voting).
67. Id. at 360.
68. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
69. Id. at 567–568. Reynolds did not actually use the phrase “one person, one vote.” Instead, the
language stems from Gray v. Sanders, where the Court stated: “The conception of political equality . . .
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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eas into the cities.70 And while the decision has been widely praised as
necessary to counter legislative entrenchment and the reality that elected
officials will seldom adopt reforms that threaten their own political viability,71 the Court, it should be remembered, also applied one person, one vote
in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado,72 where legislative entrenchment was not at issue. In Lucas, the state of Colorado approved a system of unequal apportionment for its state senate through voter
initiative, indicating that the citizens desired to have a political system in
place that reinforced regional representation over and above simple equipopulation apportionment concerns.73 As Justice Stewart argued in dissent,
the Court arguably “convert[ed] a particular political philosophy into a constitutional rule.”74
Nevertheless, for every example of federal judicial interference in a
state’s internal political culture there are counterexamples in which the
states have been left to develop and maintain their own political cultures
without federal interference.75 In Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph
70. Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in Constitutional Law
Stories (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed., Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2009) (describing Reynolds as
an “earth-shattering decision”).
71. See e.g. David Strauss, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Is Carolene Products Obsolete?,
2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1251, 1260–1261 (noting the importance of Reynolds for overcoming legislative
entrenchment).
72. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964).
73. See id. at 717–718.
74. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75. Some of the Court’s decisions leaving the states alone, of course, can be subject to considerable
criticism. Giles v. Harris, for example, is a particularly ignominious decision in which the Court, per
Justice Holmes, refused to act in facing a Fifteenth Amendment challenge to a state that refused to
register African-Americans. 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903). Although Justice Holmes’s opinion apparently
recognized that a constitutional violation may have occurred, he refused to intervene, claiming it was
beyond the Court’s power to assure that any remedy it might offer could be judicially enforced. Id. at
487 (“We express no opinion as to the . . . unconstitutionality beyond saying that we are not willing to
assume that they are valid.”).
Another such example is Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove v. Green where the Court
turned down a challenge to mal-apportionment under the Guaranty Clause because, in its words, it
wanted to avoid entering into the “political thicket” of reapportionment. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). See
also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 47 (1849) (refusing to examine which one of two political factions,
after competing elections, was entitled to lay claim to lead the state government of Rhode Island, even
though the basis of one side’s position was that the other had been chosen by an electorate composed of
only 40% of the free white male population).
The Court, of course, eventually moved on from Giles and Colegrove. The Court abandoned Giles
when it began to address racial discrimination in voting rights cases. See e.g. Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960). And in Baker v. Carr, the Court reversed the result in Colegrove and entered into
the “political thicket” by bypassing the Guaranty Clause and holding that apportionment cases were
justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–210 (1962).
Some, of course, might cite Gomillon and Baker (and by negative example, Giles and Colegrove)
for the proposition that the Court should more actively intervene into the states’ internal political cultures. But while the Court’s intervention in Gomillon and Baker may be uncontroversial, there are
counterexamples where judicial involvement may not have been so beneficent. See e.g. Republican
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v. Oregon,76 for example, the Court, in a very far-reaching decision affecting a state’s political culture, refused to intervene to determine whether the
“direct democracy” processes of initiative and referendum were constitutionally permissible.77 In other cases, the Court has left undisturbed state
rules governing ballot access,78 write-in candidacies,79 open primary systems,80 and measures that serve to protect the two-party system.81 It has
upheld even the most partisan methods of reapportionment and redistricting.82 And while the Court has struck down state-imposed term limits for
members of Congress,83 it has signaled that it would not question the constitutionality of term limits for state elected officials.84
Campaign finance is the last piece of this puzzle. To what extent
should campaign finance rules be left to the states and to what extent should
campaign finance rules be federalized either through Congressional enactment or judicial decision?
Obviously, there has already been considerable movement on this
question. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress took a lead in
federalizing campaign finance rules (at least as applied to elections for federal officers) when it passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 197185
and its amendments in 1974.86 And it has continued to act in this area most
notably in its passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.87
The Court has also played an active role in federalizing campaign finance
law, not only by the precedential effects of its First Amendment decisions
striking down federal campaign finance restrictions, but also more directly
in invalidating, among other measures, state campaign contribution limits88
and state measures designed to encourage candidates to participate in state
Party of Minn., 536 U.S. 765 (holding that candidates for judicial office have a First Amendment right
to announce their stands on political issues).
76. Pac. Sts. Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. Or., 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
77. Id. at 150–151.
78. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 727–728 (1974).
79. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
80. Wash. St. Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444 (2008).
81. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 369–370 (1997). See also Richard L.
Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the
Democrats and Republican from Political Competition, 1997 S. Ct. Rev. 331, 331–332 (1997) (noting
the effect of Timmons in protecting the two-party system).
82. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 410–413 (2006).
83. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
84. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
85. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (enacted under the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)).
86. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (1988) (enacted under Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)).
87. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
88. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244–246 (2006).
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public financing schemes.89 Citizens United and American Tradition Partnership90 are just the latest efforts in this area. The Montana Court’s decision in Western Tradition Partnership, however, suggests that at least for
some the question of whether such federalization is advisable remains unresolved.
IV.

THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DEVOLVING
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

A number of years ago, prior to the Court’s decision in Citizens
United, I wrote an article suggesting that campaign finance laws governing
federal elections be devolved to the states.91 In part, I based this argument
on the fact, discussed above, that states have very different political cultures;92 and that money, in particular, plays a much different role in large
media-driven states like California than in smaller more grassroots states
like New Hampshire or Montana.93 I therefore suggested that it might
make sense for different states to have different campaign finance rules
because the political dynamics of the states were so dramatically different.
I supported this claim for devolution with other rationales. First, I asserted that devolving campaign finance to the states would lessen some of
the problems in legislative entrenchment that occur when elected officials
are permitted to enact the rules that affect their own chances of re-election.94 Having the states set forth the campaign finance rules governing the
election of federal officials would not rid the problems of legislative entrenchment entirely—state legislators might still be motivated to pass laws
they believe would benefit their own political party—but there would at
least be some space between those making the decisions and those most
directly affected by them.95
Second, I argued that devolving campaign finance laws to the states
might help ameliorate some of the unintended consequences that inevitably
arise from campaign finance regulation.96 One of the problems with cam89. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2828 (2011).
90. Am. Tradition Partn., 132 S. Ct. 2490.
91. William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance for Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev.
335 (2000).
92. Id. at 383–384 (“[D]ifferences in the role of money and politics may be based on political
tradition. Corporations and labor unions have historically been more active in Michigan than in Oregon.
Political parties have historically been more powerful in Illinois than in Nevada.”).
93. Id. at 383.
94. Id. at 380.
95. Id. at 377–379.
96. Id. at 379–380.
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paign finance reform is that some of its efforts unintentionally backfire.97
Enacting campaign finance reform at the state level would localize, and
therefore lessen, any adverse effects.98
Third, I contended that devolution in this area was advisable as “it
would allow the integration of campaign finance with other state campaign
and election law” that affect funding issues.99 The cost of elections depends in part on the rules governing those elections. It is more expensive,
for example, to run for office in a state in which candidates are chosen by
primaries than it is to run in states in which candidates are chosen by internal party procedures; the former generally requires significant expenditures
to directly reach voters while the latter requires reaching out to only relatively few decision-makers.100 Allowing states to adjust their campaign finance rules to reflect such realities would both assist the states in enacting
legislation that corresponds to their other laws governing elections and perhaps encourage the states to more thoroughly analyze proposed election
laws through the lens of its effects on campaign funding issues.101
Fourth, I suggested that devolution might increase citizen participation
in the political process.102 In so arguing, I relied upon Justice O’Connor’s
observation that “federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government” by bringing the locus of political decision-making closer to the people.103 Decentralizing campaign finance
therefore would allow citizens to more closely participate in formulating the
rules that affect citizen participation itself.
Finally, I argued that decentralization would allow for much needed
experimentation in ways to address the issues raised by the influence or
over-influence of money in politics.104 In that light, I contended the rationale offered by Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann105 that
states should serve as laboratories for “experimentation in things social and
97. See Marshall, supra n. 91, at 342. Contribution limitations, for example, have diverted funds
from candidates to independent expenditure groups leading to a scenario in which political ads are run
without any accountability. At least when the candidate ran the ad, there was the possibility that she
would face political backlash if the ad was untruthful or in bad taste. Now the candidate is not politically accountable for such ads because she is not directly responsible for them.
98. Id. at 379.
99. Id. at 381.
100. Id. at 357.
101. Id. at 381.
102. Id. at 383.
103. Marshall supra. n. 91, at 383 (quoting Fed. Energy Reg. Commn. v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742, 789–
790 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (cited in Akhil Reed
Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1229, 1233–1234
(1994))).
104. Marshall, supra n. 91, at 384.
105. New St. Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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economic”106 was particularly well-suited to campaign finance reform because the stakes underlying the campaign finance project were so high and
the risks and possibilities of error were so great.107 Moreover, unlike economic or social problems that do not automatically stop at a state’s borders,
political cultures do.108 The problems addressed by regulations of the political process are truly state bound.
To these rationales, Professor Anthony Johnstone has offered another
powerful reason: federalism.109 Decentralization of campaign finance rules
(and other rules governing the political process), he argues, serves the value
of federalism by allowing states both to increase political accountability and
flexibility and reduce the power of interest group entrenchment at the federal level.110 As such, protecting the states’ political cultures serves to both
promote democratic experimentation111 and diffuse political power in a way
that the homogenization of the states’ political systems would not. Further,
as Johnstone explains, decentralization also allows the states to develop
their own visions of what constitutes a “Republican form of government,”
an issue on which there is no national consensus.112
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Not surprisingly, despite its possible merits, the suggestion that campaign finance rules be devolved to the states never gained traction as a
possible reform.113 In fact, it is likely an overstatement to claim that the
thesis caused even a ripple in the campaign finance reform debate. Western
Tradition Partnership, however, once again brings to the fore the question
of whether campaign finance regulation is best accomplished at the state
level. But the issue now is not whether such an approach is advisable from
a policy perspective but rather whether such an approach is constitutional
given the Court’s First Amendment rulings on national campaign finance
legislation.114 This section examines that issue.
106. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
107. Marshall, supra n. 91, at 384–385.
108. See supra nn. 40–43 and accompanying text.
109. Johnstone, supra n. 54.
110. Id.
111. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998).
112. Johnstone, supra n. 54.
113. In offering devolution as a possible approach to campaign finance regulation, I was careful not
to overstate its political viability. Public choice theory suggests that members of Congress might not
want to entrust to state legislative bodies the power to make rules that would affect their own chances
for re-election. See Marshall, supra n. 91, at 377–379.
114. See e.g. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2828; Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. at 913; Davis v. Fed. Election Commn., 554 U.S. 724, 741–744 (2008); Fed. Election Commn. v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–470 (2007).
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Greater Deference to State Campaign Finance Laws?

One possible argument is that the Court should less rigorously review
state campaign finance laws under the First Amendment than it does national legislation. I rejected that suggestion in my earlier piece, however,
and continue to be wary of it here. The Court has never, to my knowledge,
treated state laws more leniently than federal laws, and, if anything, it has,
from time to time, seemed more inclined to act in the other direction and be
more receptive to upholding federal laws than upholding those laws’ state
counterparts.115
The idea that state legislation should be reviewed more deferentially
than federal legislation under the First Amendment is controversial. As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked, “I do not think the United States
would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress
void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States.”116
The position that state campaign finance laws should be more leniently
reviewed than their federal counterparts, however, has some support. Justice Jackson, for example, raised such a possibility in his dissenting opinion
in Beauharnais v. Illinois,117 when he argued that states should have more
latitude under the First Amendment than the federal government in enacting
group libel laws.118 Justice Harlan made a similar point in his dissents in
obscenity cases,119 contending that legislative experimentation at the state
level was needed with respect to obscenity regulation because the issues
115. Compare Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commun. Commn., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding a
federal affirmative action program) with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(striking down a state affirmative action program). Metro Broadcasting was subsequently overruled in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Compare also U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (holding that a federal interest in administering its tax laws constituted a compelling governmental interest sufficient to overcome a free exercise challenge) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (holding that a state interest in administering its unemployment compensation laws did not constitute a sufficiently compelling reason to overcome a free exercise challenge). Sherbert was subsequently limited in Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
The observation that courts have a tendency to uphold federal laws more easily than they uphold
parallel state provisions is documented in Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 822 (2006).
116. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal Papers 291, 295–296 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1920). This statement echoes the sentiments of Chief Justice John Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 17, in The Federalist 100 (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000 Modern Library Edition, Random House, Inc. 2000); James
Madison, The Federalist No. 45, in The Federalist 293; James Madison, The Federalist No. 46, in The
Federalist 299. See also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale L.J. 1552, 1584 (1977).
117. Beauharnais v. Ill., 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
118. Id. at 294–295 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
119. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203–204 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. U.S., 354
U.S. 476, 503–504 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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were so difficult—a rationale that also applies to campaign finance.120 And
perhaps most importantly for our purposes, Justice Rehnquist made the argument directly in the context of campaign finance regulation, when, expressly relying on Justices Jackson and Harlan, he wrote, “that not all of the
strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon Congress are carried
over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”121
Nevertheless, there are strong arguments for not diluting First Amendment doctrine in its application to state campaign finance laws as opposed
to its application to federal campaign finance laws. First and most broadly,
the position that state laws in any area be more deferentially reviewed than
federal laws is problematic on a number of counts. To begin with, the numerous checks in the federal legislative process serve better to protect constitutional rights than do state legislative processes, which are generally
more subject to capture.122 Further, the size and scope of the federal government also work to better insulate the Congress from the pressures to
undercut constitutional guarantees than occurs at the state level.123 For
these reasons, many have persuasively argued that, if anything, judicial review should be less deferential when applied to state enactments than when
applied to federal.124 Second, and more specifically, campaign finance regulations operate in an area in which judicial review is particularly warranted. The problem of political self-dealing, even if it is tempered by decentralization, argues strongly against an added layer of deference based on
the locus of the regulatory decision-maker.125 Finally, as Buckley v.
Valeo126 holds, campaign finance regulation affects activity at the core of
the First Amendment.127 Although there may be an argument, as Professors
Schauer and Pildes maintain, that the Court should carve out a category of
120. See supra Section IV.
121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
122. See Choper, supra n. 116, at 1584–1585 (“On states [sic] rights matters, ‘the people of all the
States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress’; Congress is thus ‘subject to political
restraints which can be counted on to prevent abuse.’ But state and local legislatures contain no representatives of the central government or of those persons outside the jurisdiction upon whom the weight
of the local laws may fall. . . . [T]he force of special interest groups is markedly greater in local
legislative bodies than in the federal political process . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
123. See e.g. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10 64 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet 1961) (“The
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to
spread a general conflagration through the other States.”). See also Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear
Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269, 276 (1993) (“[I]t is highly likely that the institutions of a large, national
federation will in many ways be better decision-makers than the institutions of small, relatively more
homogenous entities such as the states.”).
124. See Choper, supra n. 116; Calabresi, supra n. 123.
125. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U. Press
1980).
126. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
127. Id. at 14–15.
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election speech for more deferential regulation than speech in other areas,128 that argument applies to the treatment of election speech generally
and does not distinguish between state and federal regulators.
B.

Differences among the States

The more substantial constitutional argument is the one offered by the
Montana Supreme Court—that the political culture of a particular state can
serve as a compelling state interest justifying campaign finance regulation
even if the political cultures in other states might not be sufficiently compelling.129 Under this approach, the constitutionality of campaign finance
restrictions could vary from state to state even if the campaign finance restriction in question is exactly the same. That is, a provision such as a
restriction on corporate campaign contributions might be permissible in one
state and invalid in another, depending upon that state’s political culture.
It is, of course, at least awkward that something like a restriction on
corporate contributions could be deemed permissible under the First
Amendment in Montana yet an exactly parallel provision be unconstitutional in New York. Such a result, however, is not incompatible with constitutional doctrine. The compelling interest test,130 under which restrictions upon First Amendment rights are measured, requires a balancing between the speech right at stake and the strength of the state’s interest. And
although strict scrutiny demands a particularly strong state interest in order
for a challenged provision to survive, strict scrutiny does not mean “‘strict’
in theory and fatal in fact” as Gerald Gunther once asserted.131 Rather, as
Adam Winkler has documented, many laws can, and do, survive the strict
scrutiny inquiry.132 Thus, even if corporate speech rights are constant no
matter where the location, it is certainly possible that Montana could have a
greater interest in limiting corporate contributions than New York does and
that Montana’s interest could therefore be considered compelling even if
New York’s is not. The real question is the extent that the Court would be
willing to tailor its application of the compelling interest test to the political
cultures of each specific state in this manner.133
128. See Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1803 (1999).
129. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 235–236.
130. E.g. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” (citations omitted)).
131. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
132. See Winkler, supra n. 115, at 795–796, 822.
133. For an argument that courts should tailor the application of constitutional tests to the level of
government involved, see Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
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In this regard it is notable that there is some non-judicial precedent for
treating the states differently on account of political culture. Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”),134 in particular, varies its coverage of the
states based upon the latters’ history and culture of racial discrimination.135
Under Section 5, states that are considered “covered jurisdictions,” because
of factors indicating a history and culture of racial discrimination, must
seek “preclearance” from either U.S. District Court or the Department of
Justice if they initiate changes to their voting rules or procedure (including
redistricting and reapportionment).136 Non-covered states, however, are exempt from such requirements. Thus it could be argued that if a state’s political culture can be relevant in determining VRA coverage, so might a
state’s political culture be relevant in determining the scope and application
of the First Amendment.137 Moreover, because Congress’s treating states
differently under Section 5 on account of history and political culture was
upheld by the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,138 it might be further
argued that there is some judicial authority for states to be treated differently under the First Amendment.
To be sure, the Section 5 example is not fully on point. First, the issue
raised by Section 5 and addressed in Katzenbach was whether congressional legislation can apply differently or selectively to states; the First
Amendment is not a piece of legislation. Second and related, Katzenbach
concerned efforts by the national Congress to apply different rules to different states, not to attempts by states themselves, because of their own political history and culture, to apply different rules to those within their jurisdiction than might be constitutionally permissible in other states.139 Third,
Principles, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513 (2005) (discussing whether the courts should tailor the application
of constitutional tests to the level of government enacting the challenged provision; i.e., whether courts
should distinguish between provisions enacted at the state or local level as opposed to provisions enacted by the federal government). Rosen does not address whether courts should tailor their decisions
based upon the circumstances of specific states as is suggested here.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (enacted under the Voting Rights Act of 1965), 79 Stat. 437 (1982).
135. See S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (determining that “[t]he constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it
reflects”).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); 28 C.F.R. § 51.10.
137. The constitutionality of Section 5 is currently before the Court, which granted certiorari in
Shelby County v. Holder on November 9, 2012. 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), opinion below at 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012). The challengers’ claim, however, is not that treating the states differently is unconstitutional per se, but that the initial reasons for treating certain jurisdictions differently have eroded since
the time the VRA was passed. See also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,
197, 203 (2009) (declining to reach the constitutional question, but indicating, in dicta, that if voter
discrimination is no longer particularly problematic in covered jurisdictions, Section 5 may be unconstitutional (emphasis added)).
138. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308.
139. Katzenbach addressed the legality of Section 5 under the so-called “doctrine of the equality of
states,” but that doctrine may be something of a misnomer. As the Court explained: “The doctrine of the
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Katzenbach employed a less demanding “rational means” test to the VRA
when it upheld Section 5;140 the question of whether a similar campaign
finance law can be upheld in one state and not another involves the application of the much more demanding “compelling interest” test directly to the
provisions at issue.141 Thus, even if the Section 5 example suggests that
there would be no constitutional difficulty solely because a law might be
upheld in one state and not in another because of differing political cultures,
it does not reach whether the preservation of a particular state’s political
culture would be enough to constitute a compelling government interest for
either state. Still, the Section 5 experience does show a state’s political
culture can matter in the constitutional equation.
Nevertheless, even if theoretically possible that the Court could reach
dissimilar results in reviewing the constitutionality of a particular type of
provision depending upon the unique circumstances of the states in which
the issue arose, I am not aware of any instances in which the Court has
actually done so. Perhaps this issue may come up if the Court chooses to
again review the constitutionality of voter identification laws142 given that
the lower courts seem to reach different outcomes depending on how well
the states have demonstrated that there is a voter fraud problem to be redressed.143
But even if the Court does reach the issue, there are still practical if not
constitutional reasons to be skeptical that the Court would actually be willing to tailor its analysis of the constitutionality of campaign rules to the
states’ political cultures. First, the Court might be troubled that reaching
differing results on parallel measures would lead to the appearance of
anomalous or arbitrary results. As noted earlier, it is at least awkward that a
equality of States . . . does not bar [Congress’s choice to limit its attention to the geographic areas where
immediate action seemed necessary through the VRA], for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon
which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared.” 383 U.S. at 328–329.
The level of scrutiny to be applied when examining the constitutionality of the national government’s treating states differently also appears to be quite lenient. See Louis Touton, The Property
Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 817, 834–835 (1980) (“[T]he
equal footing doctrine does not require the federal government to treat every state equally. . . . Because
different states embrace different portions of the nation, ‘area, location, geology, and latitude have created great diversity’ . . . . Congress must be able to adapt legislation admittedly within its power to meet
these naturally diverse local needs.” (internal citations omitted)).
140. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use
any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”) (emphasis added).
141. See e.g. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
142. See Crawford v. Marion Co. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (rejecting a facial challenge to Indiana’s voter ID law).
143. See generally Brennan Center for Justice, Court Cases: Voter ID, http://www.brennancenter.
org/content/resources/court_cases/category/voter_id (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (listing the voter ID
cases).
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provision found constitutional in Montana could be unconstitutional in New
York. Second, the Court might also be concerned with the workload costs
inherent in an approach that would require it to review the constitutionality
of controversial regulatory measures state by state rather than allow it to
decide the matter wholesale. What is clear, however, is that, whether for
these reasons or others, none of the United States Supreme Court Justices
reviewing the Montana decision appeared to take the state court’s tailoring
approach seriously.144 The problem is that respect for the divergence in the
states’ political cultures means they should have.145
VI.

POSTSCRIPT—THE DECLINE IN THE UNIQUENESS OF STATES’
POLITICAL CULTURES

One other matter needs to be addressed before concluding. The argument that the states’ unique political cultures should be preserved, of
course, depends upon the states actually having differing political cultures.
And in that respect it must be noted that although many of the distinguishing structural features between the states discussed above remain intact,146
there is no doubt that state politics have become increasingly nationalized in
the last few years. Part of this is due to the fact that some local issues may
achieve national prominence because they are seen as harbingers of matters
that will soon arise on the national stage.147 Another part of this is because
national interest groups work to implement the same types of laws in a
variety of states,148 thus nationalizing the debate over the advisability of
these laws. And perhaps most saliently, much of this phenomenon stems
144. See supra nn. 13–14 and accompanying text.
145. Cf. Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict
Scrutiny after Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 169 (2000) (“Strict scrutiny must be calibrated
to the goals it has inarticulately but inescapably been designed to serve.”).
146. See supra Section III.
147. The Wisconsin recall election appears to be such an instance. See Tom Kertscher, Behind the
Rhetoric: The In-State, Out-of-State Campaign Money Debate, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel: PolitiFact
Wisconsin,
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2012/may/22/behind-rhetoric-state-out-statemoney-debate/ (May 22, 2012) (reporting the opinion of one Wisconsin lobbyist: “donors outside of
Wisconsin are motivated to give, depending on their political persuasion, because they want to see
[Republican Governor] Walker’s reforms replicated or squelched in other states. The recall is also a
‘mini-barometer’ on the presidential election and the result could give a ‘psychological boost’ either to
President Barack Obama or . . . Mitt Romney”).
148. See Mike McIntire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/us/alec-a-tax-exempt-group-mixes-legislators-and-lobbyists.html
(Apr. 21, 2012) (describing the American Legislative Exchange Council, which promotes national policies in state legislatures and creates model legislation advancing a conservative agenda) (cited in Johnstone, supra n. 54); Raymond Hernandez, Bloomberg Starts ‘Super PAC,’ Seeking National Influence,
N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/nyregion/bloomberg-forming-super-pac-to-influence2012-races.html (Oct. 17, 2012) (reporting that New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg plans to spend
$10–15 million in competitive state, local and congressional races backing candidates who support his
biggest policy initiatives, already having spent to support candidates in Illinois, Maine, and California).
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from the influence of money. Already, for example, money from out-ofstate contributions floods local elections;149 and as a result, local politicians
may feel that they are equally, if not more, accountable to their national
funders than to their actual constituents.150 Even more broadly, the role of
money in politics may have already become so pervasive in every state’s
politics, that it may be too hard to correct against its further encroachment.
The uniqueness of a state’s political culture and therefore the need to preserve it, particularly with respect to the role of money, may be rapidly becoming a relic of the past.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In its Western Tradition Partnership decision, the Montana Supreme
Court ruled that the constitutionality of state campaign finance restrictions
should be reviewed with particular reference to the political history and
traditions of the state enacting the regulation. In so holding, the Montana
Court recognized that the states have different political cultures and that
these different political cultures can lead to very different regulatory concerns. On this basis, the Montana Court concluded that a type of campaign
finance restriction that may be unconstitutional when applied to national
elections or to elections in one state might be constitutionally permissible
when applied to elections in another. The United States Supreme Court did
not take this argument seriously. It should have. The political cultures of
the states are different, and applying a one-size-fits-all prescription to the
constitutionality of campaign finance rules undercuts both this reality and
sound principles and protections of federalism.

149. See Patrick M. Garry, Derek A. Nelsen & Candice J. Spurlin, Raising the Question of Whether
Out-of-State Political Contributions May Affect a Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the
South Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 35, 46 (2010) (noting the effect of outside
contributions on a state ballot measure). See also N.Y. Mayor Bloomberg Didn’t Fare Well Backing
California Campaigns, L.A. Times, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/07/nymayor-bloomberg-didnt-fare-well-in-backing-california-campaigns.html (July 27, 2012) (noting the efforts of New York Mayor and billionaire Michael Bloomberg to spend money to influence political
issues in other states).
150. Cf. William P. Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism,
22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 139, 151 (1998) (noting that federal officeholders may be more responsive
to their funders than to their constituents).

